The Supreme Court has not recognized age and gender as suspect classifications, though some lower courts treat gender as a suspect or quasi-suspect classification. Legislation discriminating on the basis of religion or ethnicity, as well as those statutes that affect fundamental rights, also are inherently suspect. The Court struck down the law because Virginia failed to prove a compelling STATE INTEREST in preventing interracial marriages. The Court noted that race was the basis for the classification and that it was, therefore, suspect. 2d 1010 (1967), scrutinized a Virginia statute that prohibited interracial marriages. For example, the Supreme Court in Loving v. Race is the clearest example of a suspect classification.

Although strict scrutiny is not a precise test, it is far more stringent than the traditional RATIONAL BASIS TEST, which only requires the government to offer a reasonable ground for the legislation. If this is proved, the state must then demonstrate that the legislation is narrowly tailored to achieve the intended result. To withstand strict scrutiny, the government must show that its policy is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. STRICT SCRUTINY of a suspect classification reverses the ordinary presumption of constitutionality, with the government carrying the burden of proving that its challenged policy is constitutional. Though it is now widely recognized that no compelling justification existed for the relocation order and that racial prejudice rather than national security led to the forced removal of Japanese Americans, Korematsu did signal the Court's willingness to apply the Equal Protection Clause to suspect classifications. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions racial antagonism never can. Where for strict scrutiny, the government needs a compelling interest, in.

It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. The big difference, however, is in the actual level of scrutiny applied. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. BLACK, in his majority opinion, stated thatĪll legal restrictions which curtail the CIVIL RIGHTS of a single group are immediately suspect. The Court upheld the 'relocation' of Japanese Americans living on the West Coast during WORLD WAR II, yet Justice HUGO L. Further Readingįor more on strict scrutiny, see this Catholic University Law Review article, this University of Vermont Law Review article, and this University of Pittsburgh Law Review article.The concept of suspect classifications was first discussed by the Supreme Court in KOREMATSU V. Notably, the Supreme Court has refused to endorse the application of strict scrutiny to gun regulations, leaving open the question of which precise standard of review is to be employed when addressing the Second Amendment. Restrictions on content-based speech, for instance, are to be reviewed under the strict scrutiny standard as well. The application of strict scrutiny, however, extends beyond issues of equal protection. For a court to apply strict scrutiny, the legislature must either have passed a law that infringes upon a fundamental right or involves a suspect classification. Suspect classifications include race, national origin, religion, and alienage. Strict scrutiny will often be invoked in an equal protection claim. The other two standards are intermediate scrutiny and rational basis review. Strict scrutiny is the highest standard of review which a court will use to evaluate the constitutionality of governmental discrimination. Strict scrutiny is often used by courts when a plaintiff sues the government for discrimination. To pass strict scrutiny, the legislature must have passed the law to further a 'compelling governmental interest,' and must have narrowly tailored the law to achieve that interest. Strict scrutiny is a form of judicial review that courts use to determine the constitutionality of certain laws.

Ordinary scrutiny